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Fonagy and colleagues have recently proposed that deficits in the capacity for epistemic
trust (i. e., the expectation that interpersonal communication is relevant to the addressee)
are fundamental to psychopathology. In this paper, we consider the implications of this
hypothesis for understanding the role of aggression in conduct disorder and conduct
problems more generally. Our main proposal is to view conduct problems not only as
reflecting dysregulation, but as an adaptation that allows communication with others who
are (or are perceived to be) unreliable. Our formulation hinges on two propositions. The
first one is to view aggression as a modality of communication adapted to scenarios
in which the communicator expects the audience to have low epistemic trust in the
communicator. The second idea is to conceptualize the failed “unlearning of aggression”
as reflecting a lack of interest in maintaining one’s reputation as a communicator, which
in turn stems from a lack of epistemic trust in other communicators. In this paper, we
discuss these ideas and examine how they may account for the developmental pathways
that lead young people to develop conduct problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Conduct disorder is a global public health issue. It is diagnosed in children and adolescents who
have a tendency to violate the rights of others and societal norms (1, 2), and it is associated with
extremely high levels of service utilization and costs across the lifespan (3). It is the most common
reason for referral to child and adolescent mental health services in developed countries [see e.g.
(4, 5)], and its prevalence among juvenile offenders is in excess of 61% (6). Overall, conduct disorder
accounts for∼1% of all years lived with disability at a global level (7).
While research has documented the diverse risk factors that predict conduct disorder [see (8)],
integrating these into a comprehensive explanatory theory has proved to be more difficult. A major
challenge in this direction is the heterogeneity of conduct disorder as a diagnostic category (9, 10).
Around 40% of young patients with a diagnosis of conduct disorder engage in deliberate, goal-
directed aggressive acts and rule-breaking, while the remaining 60% mainly tends to show reactive
aggression in response to (perceived) threats (11). Some of these patients begin to experience
conduct problems in early childhood, while others do so only in adolescence (12). Many have
comorbid ADHD, while others experience severe mood and anxiety disorders in addition to
conduct problems (13). Given such heterogeneity, doubts have been raised that we can identify
a single causal explanation underpinning conduct disorder in all its different presentations (14).
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Several authors have suggested that, before we can indicate a
specific core of this disorder, we will need to refine or subdivide
the existing diagnosis further (8).
Such calls for greater specification encounter additional
challenges. In fact, not only is conduct disorder internally
heterogeneous, but it also has diffuse boundaries. Namely, it
is far from clear how we can distinguish between children
and adolescents who display antisocial behavior because of an
individual dysfunction and those who primarily do so because
of ongoing and sometimes short-lived environmental influences.
It has been known for a long time that there are many children
and adolescents who primarily display antisocial behavior as a
reaction to negative environmental circumstances [see e.g., (15)],
or because of group pressures toward modeling their deviant
peers (16). During early toddlerhood and middle adolescence, an
increase in conduct problems is even expected and considered
“normal” (17). As a consequence, influential scholars have urged
to make the existing criteria for diagnosing conduct disorder
more stringent [e.g., (18)].
In this paper, we contribute to the evolving conceptualization
of conduct disorder by exploring the meaning of aggression
and rule-breaking, two behaviors that are at the core of the
diagnosis (as well as other diagnoses, such as oppositional defiant
disorder). Indeed, though further efforts to improve the diagnosis
of conduct disorder are most welcome, its heterogeneity and
fuzzy boundaries may suggest the need to consider alternatives
to a disorder-centered approach to explanation [see (11)]. Our
focus on conduct problems rather than on conduct disorder
per se builds upon previous work by Fonagy and Luyten (11),
who attempted to move past current diagnostic limitations of
conduct disorder by examining its underlying mechanisms in a
trans-diagnostic light.
In this paper we propose that conduct problems such as
aggression and rule-breaking are at least in part the result of
chronic or temporary failures in the capacity for epistemic trust.
Following Fonagy and Allison (19), we define epistemic trust as
the expectation that interpersonally communicated information
is true and relevant1, and that communicators intend it to
be so. Similar to these authors, we also adopt the view that
a lack of epistemic trust may be a main factor undermining
resilience to developing psychopathology in general. Our work
here attempts to consider the implications of this hypothesis
for understanding conduct problems in particular. Differently
from previous approaches, we propose to view conduct problems
as functional, if only sub-optimal, communicative adaptations,
rather than merely as dysfunctions. Aggression, as we shall argue,
seems to preserve the possibility of an individual to be listened to
and understood when others have only minimal epistemic trust
in him or her. The failure to inhibit aggressive behaviors and
the tendency to violate rules, on the other hand, may reflect a
disregard for protecting one’s reputation when not cooperating
seems beneficial, due to low epistemic trust in others.
1The notion of relevance used in this paper is drawn from Relevance theory (20).
In Relevance theory, a piece of communicated information is relevant, among
other things, if it is possible to derive true consequences from it. In this use of
the concept, “relevance” entertains a relation of entailment with truth.
A theory of conduct disorders based on epistemic trust
should address a number of questions; in this paper, we will
discuss them in turn. First, we will examine what factors may
lead to decreased epistemic trust in the first place. Second,
drawing from the work of Dan Sperber and other linguists, we
will consider how diminished epistemic trust may determine
distinct strategies for interpreting communication (21, 22). In
the third and the fourth sections, basing ourselves on recent
linguistics and evolutionary psychology, we will discuss our
proposal of two mechanisms that underpin aggression and its
failed inhibition. Though aggressive and rule-breaking behaviors
are highly correlated (23, 24), we will suggest that the prevalence
of the first or the second of the two mechanisms may explain
the prominence of aggression or rule-breaking in different
presentations of conduct disorder, respectively. Before outlining
our new theory, we shall provide a short introduction to previous
research on conduct disorder.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CONDUCT
DISORDER
Conduct disorder is diagnosed, in both the DSM-5 and ICD-
10, using a set of criteria that capture the consistent display of
behaviors such as the tendency to assault people and animals,
destroy other people’s property, lie and deceive, and violate rules
in general. Thus, unlike other mental disorders, a diagnosis of
conduct disorder is generally made with exclusive reference to
observed behavior, without attending to the subjective experience
of the individual. For this reason, the symptoms that lead to
a diagnosis of conduct disorder may be associated with varied
underlying psychological experiences.
A first distinction must be made between presentations
of conduct disorder that have an onset in childhood and
those with an onset in adolescence (10). This is an important
distinction, because the former subgroup—unless the disorder
is limited to childhood—seems to be much more impacted in
most life domains (25). A second distinction, emerging from
factor-analytic studies, has identified two partly distinguishable
subgroups of children: one characterized by reactive aggression
and hypervigilance to others’ emotional states; the other
characterized by goal-oriented or instrumental violence and rule-
breaking, rather than aggression per se [see (11)]. Individuals
in this latter subgroup, which tend to overlap with the DMS-5
label “conduct disorder with limited prosocial emotions,” may
demonstrate low empathy and callous behavior toward others.
They seem to share a pool of substantially heritable traits (26),
and seem to have more severe and persistent antisocial outcomes
than the first sub-group (27, 28).
In the past decades, various models have emerged for
explaining the development and mechanisms underlying
conduct disorder. One of the most popular of these models
emphasizes the role played by individual biases in social
information-processing (29–31). According to this model, a
tendency toward attributing hostile intentions to others may
lead to reactive aggression [see e.g., (32)], while having positive
expectations that aggressive behavior will lead to achieve
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instrumental goals may lead to rule-breaking and proactive
aggression [see e.g., (33)].
While Dodge and colleagues’ cognitive model proposes a
plausible explanation of how aggression and rule-breaking
may occur in any given situation, it does little in the way of
explaining how the cognitive dysfunctions that are purported
to cause them may develop [see (14)]. Various studies have
tested different putative causes: increased amygdala reactivity
to threatening facial expressions (34), early reinforcement
of aggressive behavior (35, 36), and experiences of social
rejection (37, 38). Crucially, following John Bowlby’s pioneering
intuitions (39), early insecure attachment relationships
have been extensively documented in youths with conduct
problems (40). Conduct problems have been found to be
related to later antisocial behavior through the mediation
of negative representations of relationships and coercive
behavior (41).
A partly different theoretical approach for conceptualizing
conduct disorder focuses not so much on the child’s or
adolescent’s propensity for aggressive conduct, but on biological
causes that may underpin children’s failure to inhibit or unlearn
aggression (42–45). It is commonly observed that, at least
until the child’s third year of life, most children frequently
display aggression (46, 47). Thus, a key question to be
addressed concerns what inhibitory processes may intervene
in the majority of individuals, and why in certain individuals
aggressive behavior persists and is consistently manifested in
various domains.
In this respect, it is generally believed that aggression
is inhibited when the individual is fully able to appreciate
the consequences of one’s actions on others’ emotions. In
this view, a primary flaw in encoding emotional stimuli
would result in a failure to inhibit aggression. According
to Blair (42), deficits in the threat response system located
in the brain stem cause dysfunctions in recognizing other
people’s fear and distress. According to van Honk and
Schutter (48), individuals with conduct disorder seem to
share a pattern of low basic fearfulness, which determines
reduced fear of punishment. Both frameworks propose
that, especially in the case of conduct disorder with high
callous-unemotional traits, these biological deficits may
undermine the child’s or adolescent’s capacity for empathy
and lead to decreased inhibition of aggressive behavior
and rule-breaking.
Fonagy and his colleagues’ early work on aggression and
conduct problems can be seen as an attempt to identify
a mechanism responsible for both the increased propensity
for aggression, and the failure to inhibit it. At the roots of
both, Fonagy and his colleagues saw a diminished ability to
interpret the actions of others as motivated by intentional mental
states, termed “mentalizing”. In this perspective, aggression is
an effective way of temporarily getting rid of painful mental
representations evoked by others, and of mentalizing as a whole
(49, 50). Reciprocally, lower mentalizing impairs one’s ability to
consider the impact of one’s actions on others, thus effectively
nullifying the main reasons that are thought to inhibit aggression
(51, 52).
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE EPISTEMIC
TRUST
Our aim in this paper is to explore how conduct problems, such
as aggression and rule-breaking, can be viewed as a consequence
of low epistemic trust. In putting forward our proposal, we build
upon recent work by Fonagy and his colleagues, who departed
from their previous focus on impaired mentalizing as the main
cause of psychopathology and increasingly underlined the role of
epistemic trust (53, 54).
Fonagy and colleagues’ emphasis on epistemic trust is
inspired by several large (N > 20,000) longitudinal studies
with psychiatric patients, which suggest that mental disorders
in general are sequentially comorbid, recurrent/chronic, and can
be aptly accounted for statistically by a single general factor
of psychopathology called ’p factor’ [see e.g., (55, 56)]. This
is consistent with robust evidence from studies in behavioral
genetics and molecular biology, which suggest that genetic
risk for developing a mental disorder is not specific to any
disorder in particular [see (57)]. Also taking into account that
the most powerful predictor of mental illness is socioeconomic
deprivation (58), Fonagy and his colleagues then argued that the
“p factor” cannot be equated with a deficit in any single cognitive
or affective skill—mentalisation or other. According to these
authors, this general factor common to psychiatric disorders
may be better conceptualized as a product of the relationship
between individual dispositions and the social environment,
or, briefly, as a lack of resilience within an individual’s social
system (53).
Fonagy and his colleagues tentatively linked such an absence
of resilience to the inability to learn from others and being
receptive to their support, which descends from low epistemic
trust (54). They believe that, without epistemic trust, resilience in
response to adversity is impaired. Young patients with conduct
disorder, especially those with high callous-unemotional trait,
can be viewed as an example of this tendency. They seem to show
a poorer response to treatments based on social learning theory
than other patients (59). Moreover, and perhaps adaptively, they
seem less affected by harsh and coercive parenting in their later
outcomes than other patients (60).
If, as we are persuaded, Fonagy and colleagues are correct
in attributing a primary role—though perhaps not exclusive—to
reduced epistemic trust in the development of psychopathology,
this role needs considerable specification. Our goal in this paper
is to sketch a preliminary framework for specifying the role of
low epistemic trust in the instance of conduct problems. Our
preliminary task in this section will be to discuss the concept
of epistemic trust and what factors may generally determine its
differing levels.
Factors that influence epistemic trust may be, on a first
approximation, grouped into two classes: those that are context-
specific; and those that reflect more general influences on how
an individual engages in communication. The first set of factors
include: the degree of the communicator’s trustworthiness (e.g.,
speaker’s expertise, past accuracy and benevolence, and access
to relevant information), the strength of the evidence provided
in support of the communicator’s claims, and the consistency
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between that which is communicated and what was previously
known by the addressee (61). This first set of factors have
been thoroughly examined by philosophers interested in the
epistemology of science and social communication [see e.g.,
(62)], and by empirical researchers on how infants learn from
adults’ testimony [see (63)]. These factors may play a key
role whenever the individual has time to decide whether trust
is justified.
Whenever such an informed evaluation is not possible, it
is likely that epistemic trust is influenced to a greater extent
by individual biases, and only to a lesser extent by context-
sensitive judgments. Just by way of example, when others make
conjectures about people’s mental states, or when they share their
subjective values and preferences, we can rarely draw on objective
evidence that we can use to assess the accuracy of what they say
(64). In these and other cases, our epistemic trust may be affected
by fast-and-frugal heuristics geared to ascribe trust on the basis
of our own trait-like dispositions to accord it or not (65).
It is remarkable that many or most of the factors that
are linked to developing a mental disorder, including conduct
disorder, can be also seen as influencing one’s capacity for
epistemic trust in a trait-like manner. For instance, impulsive or
fearless temperaments, attentional dysfunctions, and low verbal
IQ have all been associated with psychopathology in general
and conduct disorder in particular (8). At the same time, it is
likely that these factors, by making it more difficult to process
communication at a cognitive level, may reduce children’s trust in
the relevance of interpersonal communication (i.e., may impair
their capacity for epistemic trust).
Other early environmental influences known to be associated
with psychopathology and conduct disorder may lead to reduced
opportunities for relying on others’ communication. Among
these, we may mention maltreatment, insecure and disorganized
infant-caregiver attachments, poverty and marginalization, low
school readiness, and academic failure [see (57)]. Insecure and
disorganized infant-caregiver attachments—which have been
linked to increased psychopathology and externalizing problems
(66)—may be an especially important influence on epistemic
trust. Fonagy et al. have proposed that attachment relationships
create an important context in which one develops epistemic
trust (54). This hypothesis has recently been extended in order
to re-conceptualize attachment-related differences as differences
in epistemic trust [see (64, 67)].
HOW EPISTEMIC MISTRUST DETERMINES
PROBLEMS IN INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION
So far, we have discussed various factors that may exert an
influence on epistemic trust. Our next step is to describe how
low epistemic trust may underpin problems in communication,
which in our view mediate the link between low epistemic
trust and psychopathology in general, and conduct problems
in particular.
It is intuitive enough to see that epistemic trust determines
our tendency to accept a piece of information as true. Perhaps
less intuitive, but equally important, is to realize that epistemic
trust also seems to impact how we interpret the meaning
of communication [see (21)]. Indeed, even before we decide
whether to accept a piece of communicated information, we
are confronted with the task of understanding what message
communicators intends to convey through their verbal behavior.
Linguistic pragmatics suggests that this task, carried out in an
unconscious and spontaneous way, involves some measure of
epistemic trust as well.
Human communication can rarely be viewed as a process of
coding and decoding (20). Take, for instance, the sentence You
are not going to die. It will acquire different meanings when
stated by a lawyer to a prisoner fearing a death sentence, when
proclaimed by a priest to the Sunday worshippers, or when
uttered by a mother aiming to minimize her child’s alarm for
having cut his finger. In all of these scenarios, listeners are
guided toward the correct interpretation by the words uttered,
the context, and the expectation that the speaker intends to
present his or her communication as relevant from the listener’s
point of view. The prisoner does not expect his lawyer to have lost
her mind and announce to him his eternal life; the worshippers
do not think they have literally conquered death; and the child
knows that his mother means to tease him. All these various
audiences are guided in their understanding by their epistemic
trust in the speaker—in other words, by their assumption that
the communication is true and relevant, and that the speaker
intends it to be that way. In other words, whether or not the
audience eventually accepts the communicated information as
true, interpretation is already guided by some minimal stance of
trust (68).
According to a popular theory in linguistic pragmatics,
Relevance theory, this stance of trust in interpreting
communication is triggered by any communicative behavior
that seems overt and intentional, also termed ostensive (20).
With this kind of behavior, the communicator does not simply
communicate some information (as when, by wearing a tie,
one covertly conveys an impression of distinction). Through
ostensive behavior, the communicator also makes manifest an
intention to communicate that piece of information. Seeing that
communication is intentional, the listener presumes that the
speaker aims to be relevant. According to this presumption, then,
the listener goes on to interpret the speaker’s communication,
retrieving meanings that go beyond literal content, as in the
examples above.
At this stage, we can anticipate two common problems
that can arise in communication as a consequence of low
epistemic trust. The first problem is that listeners with chronically
low epistemic trust may interpret ostensive communication
differently from what speakers expect them to (69). The second
problem is that speakers themselves might already anticipate that
listeners have low epistemic trust in them and forgo the use of
ostensive communication altogether. Both problems are relevant
to conduct disorder. We will examine them in turn, in this and in
the next section, through a running example.
Imagine that you are sitting in a compartment of a train,
heading home, next to an unknown traveling companion. You
feel sleepy, and if you tilted your head you could no doubt doze
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off for a short nap. Unfortunately, your companion introduces
himself and starts chattering about something inane. What could
you do? A first possibility could be to pretend not to have
understood that he is talking to you, not stifle a yawn and close
your eyes. This communication is not ostensive. In this way, you
would be producing direct evidence of your tiredness, and your
recently met companion might stop bothering you.
An alternative possibility would be to say to your
fellow traveler:
(1) “I am really tired; I didn’t get any sleep yesterday.”
In other words, you can produce indirect, but nevertheless strong,
evidence that you feel tired and therefore prefer not to talk. This
is a case of ostensive communication. Consequently, not only you
inform your listener that you are tired, but you also communicate
your intention to inform him of this [see (20)]. As a consequence,
and provided that the listener trusts the presumption of relevance
communicated by you, he may understand your utterances as
saying more than what you literally stated (e.g., he is likely
to interpret your words as a way to stop the conversation,
not simply as a disclosure of your tiredness). However, if your
listener harbors doubt about your communicative competence
or honesty (i.e., has low epistemic trust), these implicit meanings
may not be derived. For instance, while he might interpret (4)
as an invitation to interrupt the conversation, he may suspect
that you are not tired and search for another more relevant
interpretation (for instance, he might think that you are angry
at him and react aggressively to your candid request).
Within the paradigm of attachment research, Talia et al.
(64) have explored how insecure infant-caregiver attachment
behavioral patterns may offer a typical example of low epistemic
trust. Attachment patterns are assessed in the laboratory
paradigm “Strange Situation” by observing how infants seek
proximity toward the caregiver when under stress [SSP, (70)].
According to Talia et al.’s views, low proximity-seeking toward
the caregiver (one of the main indicators of insecure infant-
caregiver attachment) may be considered as reflecting a
decreased interest in seeking information of any kind from the
caregiver, including but not limited to support and reassurance.
Talia et al. have then proposed that, because adult
communication and comprehension is based on epistemic
trust, early attachment patterns may determine later differences
in how individuals interpret and produce communication,
termed epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are individual tendencies
to focus attention onto aspects of communication that one
unconsciously expects to be more trustworthy, in part as a
consequence of early experiences with one’s main attachment
figures. Talia et al. have proposed that measures of attachment in
adults, such as the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) capture
an instance of these broad epistemic styles, in the special case of
discussing attachment experiences.
If this is correct, when compared to secure attachment
classifications, insecure attachment classifications may
generally reflect a more cautious, less trustworthy stance
toward interpersonally communicated information, and
be associated with cognitive biases in comprehension.
This may explain why infants and adults who receive an
insecure attachment classification tend to experience—
with caregivers, partners, and peers—more interpersonal
conflicts (71), are more inclined to expect that others have
negative interpersonal intentions [see e.g., (72)], respond more
negatively to moderate levels of interpersonal frustration [see
e.g., (73)], and demonstrate a lesser capacity for repairing
relational ruptures when these arise [e.g., (74)]. When
considering conduct problems, such consequences of low
epistemic trust seem especially salient and may suggest at
least one specific mechanism linking insecure attachment with
conduct problems.
FROM PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATION
TO AGGRESSION
We have discussed so far how low epistemic trust influences
how we interpret interpersonal communication. We now wish
to propose, reciprocally, that the speaker’s expectation about
the listener’s epistemic trust in him or her may influence
how speakers unconsciously design their communication [a
special case of audience design, i.e., the general phenomenon by
which communicators design their messages by considering the
perspective of the audience (75)].
We will say that, when a speaker does not expect to be trusted
by his or her audience, aggression and violence are an effective
way to supplement ostensive communication. With an audience
who may not trust that the speaker intends to provide relevant
information, aggression may be more immediately efficacious as
a form of communication. To go back to our previous example,
imagine that you are traveling companion is undeterred by your
previous statement in (4) and keeps talking. You may then
directly shut him up by imposing your hand on his mouth.
Physical coercion—rather than an indirect request—requires
considerably less cooperation from the listener, and whether
or not the listener might trust you as a communicator is of
negligible importance.
But there is another way to communicate in the absence of
epistemic trust, which is less obvious than physical coercion,
and was recently noted by Sperber in a specific example of
animal communication:
[Communication] can become so obnoxious and the annoyance
it causes so great that complying becomes desirable as a means to
put an end to the insistence itself. A form of blackmail, so to speak:
you satisfy my request, or I will keep pestering you. In such a case,
however, compliance is achieved not bymaking the message more
relevant and by convincing the audience of its legitimacy but by
imposing a social cost on the addressee (76).
Returning to our example, let us imagine that you are not able
to provide direct evidence of your tiredness, and you do not
want to use physical force to stop your petulant interlocutor.
At the same time, based on your past interaction, you do not
expect from him any charitable interpretation of further ostensive
communication. What to do? You might say:
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(2) I can’t stand all this f∗∗∗∗∗∗ nonsense! Shush!
which you might utter out loud so as to be heard by the
whole train car, prolonging your shush until your companion
stops talking.
Insofar as aggression entails information transmission, it
seems possible to view it as a type of communication. However,
as in (5), aggression is a type of communication that is not,
or not exclusively, ostensive. By uttering (5), you expect the
listener to comply with your wish to end the conversation not
in virtue of the recognition of your communicative intention,
but as a way to minimize the cost that your behavior poses to
him—that is, ongoing humiliation with other travelers or mere
annoyance. We propose to term this type of communication
perseverative. Perseverative communication does not work by
creating an expectation that communication will be true and
relevant to the audience, or high epistemic trust. It works by
creating an expectation that not attributing informative value
to the speaker’s communication will be costly, cognitively or
otherwise, and that the audience is better off complying for this
reason2.
This perspective may account for why children classified
as “disorganized” in the SSP [a main predictor of later
externalizing behavior, (66)] tend to display controlling behavior
after brief separations from their parents [see e.g., (77)]. As a
classification, infant-caregiver disorganized attachment is based
on the observation during the SSP of behaviors that suggest fear
or conflict in relation to the caregiver. It is often considered
an “extreme” version of attachment insecurity (78). In Main
and Cassidy’s study and its many replications (79), 6-year-old
children who had been previously classified as “disorganized” in
the SSP, after a 1-h-long separation from their main caregiver,
were likely to display forms of communication that appear subtly
controlling [see (77), p. 419]. Following Talia and colleagues’
ideas discussed previously, we could view these controlling
forms of communication as a consequence of extremely low
epistemic trust in the caregiver. One could say that, in the
impossibility to rely on ostensive communication as an effective
way to modify the parent’s thoughts and behaviors due to
low epistemic trust, these children may be inclined to use
perseverative communication instead. They seem to act in order
to humiliate (“You’re really clumsy”), embarrass (“I said, keep
your eyes closed!”), or reject the parent (“don’t bother me”), or
to control the parent with over-bright or compulsively caregiving
behavior (“want to play with me, mommy, in the sandbox? It’s
fun, isn’t it, mummy?”).
2As noted by Sperber (76), ostensive and (to use our terminology) perseverative
communication may co-occur. For example, aggressive behaviors such as threats
and offenses seem to achieve relevance in both ways simultaneously. They
communicate some thoughts of the speaker, as well as the speaker’s intention to
communicate those thoughts. However, until the threat has been withdrawn, or the
offense erased, a threat or an insult continues to act as a way to coerce the addressee
by inflicting a social cost. Physical aggression, too, can be seen as communication
that partly relies on ostension, partly on insistence. Merely imposing my hand
over someone’s mouth is probably insufficient to coerce any but the physically
weakest interlocutor. What makes my gesture an effective way to stop someone
from speaking is their unconscious recognition of my intention to impose on them
an increasingly high cost until they comply with my request.
The reliance on aggression, typical of conduct disorder, can be
viewed as an attempt to inform the addressee when the addressee
is perceived to have no epistemic trust in the communicator.
The communicator may have from the start low expectation
about others’ epistemic trust, perhaps because of insecure or
disorganized attachment experiences, low verbal IQ, or deficits
in executive functioning of neurodevelopmental origin (all of
which are known risk factors for developing conduct disorders).
Or the behavior of another person, perceived as a slight or a
provocation, may evoke aggressive behavior that unconsciously
aims to increase the communicator’s chances to be understood
and believed.
All children experience moments in which they do not expect
to be listened to or believed, and only some of them adopt
aggressive behaviors in a repeated and stable manner. Two
aspects should be mentioned here. The first is that ostensive
communication is a developmental achievement. All young
children wail, scream, and cry in order to attract and manipulate
others’ attention. Some children may be slower at picking up
ostensive communication, and bemore ready to use aggression in
response to evidence of low epistemic trust in their addressees. A
second aspect to consider is family dynamics, which are another
important mediator for the influence of early experiences on
later conduct problems. Work by Patterson et al. [see e.g., (80)]
has shown how some children learn to avoid parental demands
through coercive behavior in order to gain control over an
unpleasant family environment. If the parent then disengages or
withdraws in order to avoid conflict, this type of communication
gradually becomes overlearned through negative reinforcement.
FROM AGGRESSION TO CONDUCT
DISORDER
Not every individual who displays aggressive behavior early
on goes on to develop conduct disorder. Many children may
only display aversive behaviors in the family, but not exhibit
similar behavior with other people in other settings, or they may
never engage in violent behaviors such as physical aggression
or stealing. That is, many children who do engage in aggressive
behavior are able to successfully inhibit it in most contexts.
Understanding the process by which aggression is inhibited
in toddlers may require gaining a better understanding of how
moral conduct develops. We wish to refer here to a point of view
on moral conduct termed “mutualistic” (81). According to this
point of view, moral conduct is an adaptation to environments
in which individuals compete to be recruited in mutually
beneficial interactions [see e.g., (82, 83)]. Exploiting or ignoring
others, even when in the short term might bring some benefits,
eventually compromises one’s own reputation and the possibility
to be trusted by others. According to mutualistic theories of
moral conduct, it is likely that humans have evolved an adapted
propensity to judge the cost of behavior in terms of reputation.
Because computations of this sort may happen in part
unconsciously and activate powerful affects such as shame or
guilt, pro-social behavior is not exhibited only when one is
observed by others (84). As Trivers suggested [(85). p. 51 cited in
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66), “selection may favor distrusting those who perform altruistic
acts without the emotional basis of generosity or guilt because
the altruistic tendencies of such individuals may be less reliable
in the future.”
The mutualistic perspective of moral conduct fits well with
the special but fundamental case of communicative behavior.
Because humans depend for their survival and well-being on the
interpersonal transmission of information, any communication
that risks compromising one’s reputation as a communicator is
dangerous. As a speaker, an individual will be more trustworthy
if he or she refrains from using perseverative communication—
such as threats and insults. The same can be said, of course,
of speakers who misinform others, lie, and break their word.
Reciprocally, an individual proves to be trustworthy if he or she
manifests interest in what others intend to communicate, displays
guilt or empathy, and pays close attention to social cues and
the instructions given by others. By failing to do any of these
things, an individual may alienate other communicators. Because
children need to acquire a number of socio-cultural competencies
before they are able to carry out such complex computations, one
can make sense of the finding that aggression peaks at about age
two and decreases only afterwards.
Individuals with conduct problems seem to engage in many
behaviors that may compromise their reputation. Why? We
hypothesize that a child or adolescent who has no epistemic
trust that information communicated by others will be relevant
may have “little to lose” if considered untrustworthy. Of course,
an individual’s epistemic trust will vary at different times and
in different social groups. This means that aggression may be
inhibited as a function of a child’s or adolescent’s differing
expectations about the relevance of communication of others.
In this framework, the often observed linked between
aggression and low mentalizing is a result of the fact that
both of them descend from low epistemic trust. Contemporary
approaches to pragmatics assume that mentalizing is heavily
involved in language comprehension (86). When epistemic trust
is high, mentalizing is guided by the assumption that the
speaker has an intention to communicate relevant information.
When epistemic trust is low—as when the subject exhibits
aggressive behavior—the addressee may adopt different strategies
for mentalizing communicative intentions, which might entail
suspiciousness and hostile attributions.
It is important to underscore that many variables that we
have not discussed here may be important in the development
of conduct disorder. Temperament, gender, sexual maturity,
and physical strength may enhance or limit one’s potential
for violence. Further, the most typical trajectories that lead to
conduct disorders often include the encounter with a group
of peers, which may provide positive reinforcement to the
individual who displays violent behavior (87). Unmet needs for
social bonding and acceptance might increase the appeal of such
groups; among other things, they may provide a context in which
the adolescent can experience epistemic trust.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we presented a theory that conduct disorders
reflect a functional adaptation of communication geared to
enhance communication when epistemic trust is low. We
discussed how a lack of epistemic trust underlies significant
problems in comprehension. We then made the proposal that
aggression could be considered a strategy for communicating
in situations in which the listener has low epistemic trust in
the speaker. Finally, we argued that a lack of epistemic trust in
interpersonal communication makes it less likely that aggressive
behavior will be inhibited. The hypotheses presented here are
an application of Fonagy and his colleagues’ recent ideas on
epistemic trust to the specific context of conduct problems. We
hope that similar work may be conducted to apply the concept of
epistemic trust to other serious mental disorders.
Given the speculative nature of our account, the hypotheses
presented here are in need of further research and empirical
testing. Our suggestion to consider aggressive behavior as a
form of communication may be used to support research on
its activating and deactivating mechanisms. Our notion of
perseverative communication may foster a richer understanding
of aggression within the framework of cognitive linguistics. Our
proposal to view the inhibition of aggression in an evolutionary-
based framework may encourage a productive exchange between
the developmental psychopathology and mutualistic theories
of moral conduct, which to our knowledge have not been in
dialogue. Of course, in order to test these and other hypotheses,
the recent attempts to develop reliable measures of epistemic
trust are of key importance (88, 89).
We would be remiss not to acknowledge that our treatment
of conduct problems was far from comprehensive. In particular,
more work is needed for accounting for the influences of
biological factors on epistemic trust. Although we view these
influences as important, we did not examine them in depth
because, at present, relevant empirical studies that may qualify
this relationship are lacking.
We believe that the ideas presented in this theoretical article
may have some practical implications. At least in part, our article
concurs with some well-established views about the treatment of
young people with conduct disorders. If conduct problems can
be understood as resulting from a lack of epistemic trust in the
relevance of communication, our ideas support the expectation
that treatments for this condition may be most effective early on,
when these young patients’ interest in learning from other adults
(e.g. the clinician) may still be partly open. Furthermore, because
epistemic trust is a property of systems rather than individuals,
our views seem to support the use of interventions acting at the
family or peer-group level.
On the other hand, our approach may lead clinicians to
potentially embrace new perspectives. Currently, treatments for
conduct problems mainly focus on teaching parents how to
enhance their children’s impulse control, based on a social
learning model [see e.g., (90)]. On the basis of our work, it
seems possible to suggest that interventions aimed at fostering
epistemic trust, through therapeutic work with the individual
and their family, may be just as important. A common way
in which clinicians already foster epistemic trust (regardless of
whether they conceptualize their activity through this concept)
is helping create a collaborative treatment relationship in which
the patient can trust clinicians’ communications and learn to
mentalize (19). Another way, even more germane to the core
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proposal of this paper, draws from the idea that epistemic
trust also influences how a speaker produces communication.
Our focus seems to encourage therapeutic work on how young
patients and their families communicate, rather than exclusively
on the content of their communication. In our perspective,
the task of clinicians may be to show that they trust the
patient, that they take his or her perspective seriously, and that
ostensive communication can foster mutual understanding and
connection (91).
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